DUMPING

Dalam Perekonomian Internasional “dumping” dapat diartikan sebagai suatu tindakan penetapan harga yang mematikan. Istilah tersebut biasa digunakan dalam perdagangan internasional dimana dumping diartikan sebagai suatu tindakan produsen suatu negara yang mengekspor produknya ke negara lain dengan harga di bawah harga pasaran dalam negeri atau bisa juga dengan harga di bawah biaya produksinya. Dengan demikian dumping dapat didefinisikan sebagai suatu tindakan yang menetapkan harga yang lebih rendah di pasar asing untuk suatu produk yang sama dibandingkan dengan harga di pasar domestik. Berdasarkan persetujuan WTO dumping disalahkan (tetapi tidak dilarang) apabila menimbulkan kerugian bagi indusri domestik negara pengimpor.

Artikel VI GATT 1994 yang mengatur tentang anti dumping merupakan salah satu instrumen penting, bagi pengamanan industri dalam negeri suatu negara anggota WTO dari praktik perdagangan tidak adil (unfair trade) yang dilakukan dalam bentuk tindakan dumping. Artikel VI GATT 1994 ini mengijinkan otoritas di suatu negara untuk mengenakan bea tambahan dalam bentuk bea anti dumping terhadap produk-produk impor yang diduga dijual di bawah harga normal atau harga lebih murah dari harga di pasar domestik dari negara asal barang, sehingga praktik yang demikian menimbulkan kerugian bagi industri di dalam negeri dari negara tempat di pasarkan barang tersebut. Meskipun demikian agar pengenaan bea masuk anti dumping ini justru tidak dipergunakan sebagai hambatan perdagangan dengan alasan melindungi industri dalam negeri, maka WTO mengatur secara komprehensif tata cara pengenaan bea masuk anti dumpimg. Indonesia sebagai salah satu negara anggota WTO dan telah meratifikasi seluruh kesepakatan WTO berdasarkan Undang Undang Nomor 7 tahun 1994 telah mengimplementasikan ketentuan Artikel VI GATT 1994 melalui Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 34 Tahun 1996 tentang Bea Masuk Anti Dumping dan Bea Masuk Imbalan. PP ini memeberikan wewenang kepada otoritas di Indonesia untuk mengenakan bea masuk anti dumping yang baik yang sifatnya sementara maupun tetap terhadap barang-barang impor yang diduga sebagai barang dumping. Tentunya setelah melalui proses pemeriksaan atau penyelidikan yang dilakukan komita yang khusus dibentuk pemerintah untuk itu. Kebijakan Anti dumping di Indonesia merupakan bagian dari kebijakan umum bidang kepabeanan. Oleh karena itu PP No 34 Tahun 1996 sebagai dasar pelaksanaan anti dumping diletakkan sebagai peraturan pelaksana dari UU No 10 tahun 1995 tentang Kepabeanan. Pelaksanaan kebijakan anti dumping di Indonesia melibatkan berbagai lembaga yang masing-masing memiliki fungsi dan tugas khusus, yakni Komite Anti dumping Indonesia (KADI), Menteri Perdagangan, Meneri Keuangan, Direktur Jenderal Bea dan Cukai dan Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa Pajak. Meskipun dalam pelaksanaanya PP no 34 tahun 1996 telah banyak memberikan perlindungan terhadap industri dalam negeri, namun masih terdapat berbagai permasalahan dan penerapanya, baik terkait dengan subtansi aturan maupun cara penegakanya dan keterbatasan sumber daya manusia. Namun, secara umum kajian kebijakan anti dumping memeperlihatkan bahwa materi dari PP No 34 tahun 1996 tersebut sinkron dengan Anti Dumping Agreement yang tercantum dalam artikel VI GATT 1994. Bahkan kjebanyakan dari materi PP tersebut sama dengan ketentuan Artikel VI GATT 1994.

Anti-dumping actions

If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, it is said to be “dumping” the product. Is this unfair competition? Opinions differ, but many governments take action against dumping in order to defend their domestic industries. The WTO agreement does not pass judgement. Its focus is on how governments can or cannot react to dumping — it disciplines anti-dumping actions, and it is often called the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. (This focus only on the reaction to dumping contrasts with the approach of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.)

The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine (“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so.

GATT (Article 6) allows countries to take action against dumping. The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article 6, and the two operate together. They allow countries to act in a way that would normally break the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners — typically anti-dumping action means charging extra import duty on the particular product from the particular exporting country in order to bring its price closer to the “normal value” or to remove the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.

There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.

Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.

Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.

Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).

The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure

Subsidies and countervailing measures

This agreement does two things: it disciplines the use of subsidies, and it regulates the actions countries can take to counter the effects of subsidies. It says a country can use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty (known as “countervailing duty”) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers.

The agreement contains a definition of subsidy. It also introduces the concept of a “specific” subsidy — i.e. a subsidy available only to an enterprise, industry, group of enterprises, or group of industries in the country (or state, etc) that gives the subsidy. The disciplines set out in the agreement only apply to specific subsidies. They can be domestic or export subsidies.

The agreement defines two categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. It originally contained a third category: non-actionable subsidies. This category existed for five years, ending on 31 December 1999, and was not extended. The agreement applies to agricultural goods as well as industrial products, except when the subsidies are exempt under the Agriculture Agreement’s “peace clause”, due to expire at the end of 2003.

Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.

Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.

Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.

Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was 2000. Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.

Sumber:

http://www.wto.org/english/info_e/cont_e.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization